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Abstract   The status of population genetics has become hotly debated 
among biologists and philosophers of biology. Many seem to view 
population genetics as relatively unchanged since the Modern Synthesis 
and have argued that subjects such as development were left out of the 
Synthesis. Some have called for an extended evolutionary synthesis or 
for recognizing the insignificance of population genetics. Yet others 
such as Michael Lynch have defended population genetics, declaring 
"nothing in evolution makes sense except in the light of population 
genetics" (a twist on Dobzhansky's famous slogan that "nothing in 
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution"). Missing from 
this discussion is the use of population genetics to shed light on 
ecology and vice versa, beginning in the 1940s and continuing until 
the present day. I highlight some of that history through an overview 
of traditions such as ecological genetics and population biology, 
followed by a slightly more in-depth look at a contemporary study of 
the endangered California Tiger Salamander. I argue that population 
genetics is a powerful and useful tool that continues to be used and 
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modified, even if it isn't required for all evolutionary explanations 
or doesn't incorporate all the causal factors of evolution.  
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The status of population genetics has been debated recently among 
biologists and philosophers of biology. Much of the debate has 
surrounded topics that were purportedly left out of the Modern 
Synthesis, such as development. Some authors have called for reducing 
the status of population genetics in evolutionary theory, or for 
radical revisions (“critics”). Other authors have defended the status 
of population genetics, perhaps as a “cornerstone” or “backbone” of 
evolutionary theory (“supporters”). And, of course, still other 
authors have taken a position in between these two (“middle ground”). 
A brief sampling of these three positions follows.  First, here 
are some critics of population genetics:  
 
It is now approximately half a century since the neo-Darwinian 
synthesis was formulated…. Yet the successes of the theory are 
limited to the interpretation of the minutiae of evolution, such 
as the adaptive change in coloration of moths. (Ho and Saunders 
1979, p. 589) 
 
Models of genetic changes in populations do not provide us with 
much illumination of the ways in which populations evolve. (Dupré 
1993, p. 138) 
 
… millions of biology students have been taught the view (from 
population genetics) that "evolution is change in gene 
frequencies." Isn’t that an inspiring theme? This view forces the 
explanation toward mathematics and abstract descriptions of 
genes, and away from butterflies and zebras, or 
Australopithecines and Neanderthals. (Carroll 2005, p. 294) 
 
Here are some supporters of population genetics: 
 
Population genetics is the cornerstone of modern evolutionary 
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biology. (Michod 1981, p. 2) 
 
The science of population genetics is the auto mechanics of 
evolutionary biology. (Lewontin 2000, p. 5)1 
 
Nothing in evolution makes sense except in the light of population 
genetics. (Lynch 2007, p. 8598) 
 
Here are some authors offering a middle ground: 
 
Few sensible biologists would deny that the population genetic 
framework is essential to evolutionary biology…. But to require a 
population genetic approach to all questions in evolutionary 
biology seems too stringent a criterion for determining what is a 
convincing hypothesis. (Bromham 2008, p. 399) 
 
I think that while population genetics is an important part of 
evolutionary theory, it is an error and a gross simplification to 
see evolution as fundamentally a matter of changes in gene 
frequencies over time. (Pigliucci 2008, p. 317) 
 
Much of my own work has its origins in population genetics (e.g., 
Millstein 2002; Millstein and Skipper 2007; Millstein et al. 2009). 
So, I might appear to fall in the “supporter” category. However, I am 
much more comfortable in the middle ground. I think that both 
Bromham’s and Pigliucci’s points are well taken. In support of the 
former point, one need only consider some of the excellent comparative 
studies in paleontology to see that population genetics is not 
                                                
1 Note that Lewontin, in the essay from which this quote is taken and 
elsewhere, is quick to point out the limitations of population 
genetics. Also, although the “auto mechanics” comment is a bit 
cryptic, it can be reasonably interpreted as meaning “that which gets 
things going.” Judging by Lewontin’s practice, if not always his 
stated views, Lewontin is a supporter of population genetics, albeit 
not as staunch as some. 
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required for (indeed, would be impossible to apply to) all 
evolutionary questions–and one can accept this while still believing 
that population genetics is essential to evolutionary biology as a 
whole. In support of the latter point, as many other authors have 
suggested, consideration of the importance of phenomena such as 
adaptation and speciation, let alone development, are sufficient to 
show that there is more to evolution than changes in gene frequencies 
over time. The critics, however, go too far. As I shall argue in this 
article, the successes of population genetics go far beyond “the 
interpretation of the minutiae of evolution,” the models of population 
genetics do illuminate a great deal about the ways that populations 
evolve, and population genetics need not focus our attention towards 
mathematics and genes and away from the organisms themselves. 
 Indeed, I think one comes to such conclusions only by making two 
false assumptions: (1) Population genetics can be completely 
understood as a purely abstract set of mathematical models (as are 
typically found in population genetics and related textbooks)–nothing 
more. (2) Population genetics is a product of the Modern Synthesis 
period, generally dated to 1930-1950 (approximately); its models have 
remained essentially unchanged since then. Interestingly, it is not 
just the critics who make these false assumptions; these are 
widespread (albeit not universal) assumptions made by critics and 
supporters, as well as those in between. I will use Pigliucci, who I 
have categorized as belonging to the middle-ground camp, as an 
illustration, mainly because he is explicit about views that are 
implicit in many other authors. With respect to the first assumption, 
as I noted earlier, much focus has been on the claim that development 
was left out of the Synthesis. But Pigliucci claims: 
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Less well understood is the equally puzzling fact that the Modern 
Synthesis basically ignored ecology (despite a strong research 
program in evolutionary ecology), so much so that ecologists and 
evolutionary biologists now hardly talk to each other, and we 
have no organic theory of how community and ecosystems ecology 
are connected to evolutionary biology. (Pigliucci 2009, p. 136; 
emphasis added) 
 
If we think that population genetics has had little or no contact with 
the ecology of natural populations–if we think that population 
genetics is purely theoretical–then we will tend to see it as an 
abstract set of mathematical models with little relevance to much of 
anything. So, if the first assumption were correct, we ought to be 
swayed away from the supporters’ position and towards the critics’ 
position (perhaps even more so than Pigliucci himself). We might even 
be persuaded to go as far as Dupré (1993, p. 141), who asserts that 
“practical benefits neither have been delivered nor, even by the most 
ardent enthusiasts for population genetics, are they anticipated.” 
 With respect to the second assumption, Pigliucci states:  
 
There is much talk these days of the possibility that the Modern 
Synthesis, the current conceptual framework in evolutionary 
biology, is due for a makeover. … This is ruffling quite a few 
feathers, though it should not really be surprising that a theory 
proposed in the 1930s and 1940s—before the discovery of the 
structure of DNA, not to mention genomics and evo-devo—may be a 
bit out of date. (Pigliucci 2009, p. 134)2  
 
                                                
2 Okasha (2006) is even more explicit: “The basic structure of 
population-genetic theory has changed little since the days of Fisher, 
Haldane and Wright.” 
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I believe that Pigliucci and others who make implicit and explicit 
claims such as these would acknowledge that in general, theories 
change over time. I think they would even acknowledge certain types of 
changes to the models of population genetics, perhaps that they have 
incorporated more parameters or insights from molecular studies. Yet 
for some reason many talk about population genetics as though it 
hasn’t changed much–as though it is practically synonymous with the 
Modern Synthesis. Is population genetics an exception to the general 
rule that theories change, often dramatically, over time? 
 I think that the assumptions that population genetics is (1) 
purely abstract and (2) essentially unchanged since the end of the 
Modern Synthesis are mistaken. Furthermore, I think we can’t really 
evaluate the status of population genetics today until we see why 
these assumptions are mistaken. In particular, I want to highlight the 
ongoing and mutually informative relationship that ecology has had 
with population genetics, a relationship that demonstrates the falsity 
of these assumptions.3 I think that this relationship has been 
overlooked or downplayed by the majority of those who have 
participated in the recent debate over the status of population 
genetics – critics, supporters, and middle ground alike.  My primary 
goal in this article, then, is not to settle this debate (that is, I 
am not seeking to defend my middle-ground position), but rather to 
suggest that one cannot settle the debate without a more complete 
picture of what population genetics is–a picture that incorporates the 
ways in which population genetics has intersected with ecology.   
                                                
3 Lloyd (1988) articulates a confirmatory relationship between 
population genetics and ecology. Nothing I say here is meant to 
overturn her claims; instead, I mean only to describe an additional 
sort of relationship. 
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In order to examine the intersections between population genetics 
and ecology, I will provide a brief and fairly potted overview4 of the 
history of the two fields, following different strands (ecological 
genetics, population biology,5 and some more contemporary incarnations) 
where the two fields come together.6 This will include a brief overview 
of where the connection between the two fields stands today and a 
slightly more in-depth look at recent studies that integrate 
population genetics and ecology. I will limit my discussion to 
connections between ecology and population genetics, even though there 
are many interesting intersections between ecology and evolution more 
generally (Collins 2012 KLI Workshop). I will conclude with some 
general implications for our views about theories and about population 
genetics in particular. 
Even though I have circumscribed the domain of this paper, there 
will no doubt still be controversy over what counts as “population 
genetics,” what counts as “ecology,” and what counts as an 
intersection (Gerson 2007) between the two. Indeed, this is a point 
that I also wish to make: over time, as population genetics has been 
                                                
4 That is, I will be leaving out discussion of, and citations to, much 
good work. To cover it all is a book(s) length project. 
5 Here it might be objected that neither of these is considered to be 
“real” ecology by ecologists.  Personally, I have little taste for 
intra-disciplinary disputes about what counts as “real x” (for 
example, philosophers are often quick to dismiss other work because it 
does not count as “real philosophy”) and I tend to see them as more 
turf-protecting than substantive.  Here I will just note that my claim 
is not that all aspects of ecology have been incorporated into 
population genetics, but rather just that some aspects have been.  
Moreover, I suspect that many population geneticists might not 
recognize these areas as “real” population genetics either.  It would 
not be surprising if blended fields were not fully embraced by those 
at the core of each of the fields involved in the blend. 
6 For more, see, e.g., Kingsland (1985), Collins (1986), and Odenbaugh 
(2006). 
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practiced by different research groups, it has changed in many 
different directions and overlapped with many different disciplines, 
so that the boundaries between population genetics theory and 
ecological theory are no longer clear-cut (which is not to say that 
the fields are fully integrated). Roughly, though, population genetics 
might be taken to be: (1) models that assume that evolution is change 
in gene/genotype frequencies over time; (2) models that have their 
roots in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (and thus in Mendelian factor 
behavior), generally taken to be one-locus, two-allele models; or (3) 
models that track or infer frequency changes in genotypes and 
phenotypes7 over time, and the way that various evolutionary mechanisms 
affect those changes. The third is the broadest understanding of the 
three, and it is the one that I myself hold. (The first, in my view, 
is a claim that one might make about the models of population 
genetics, rather than a claim embodied by the models themselves. That 
is, one might believe that evolution is essentially gene/genotype 
frequencies over time, but mere use of the models does not imply that 
belief, since one might simply believe that the models were tracking 
one type of evolution or one aspect of evolution.) 
 
 
1. One Strand of Population Genetics and Ecology: Ecological Genetics 
 
                                                
7 Here it might be objected that population genetics tracks only 
genotypes, not phenotypes. Below, however, we shall see some cases 
where population genetics models have in fact been used to track 
changes in phenotype frequencies over time.  Of course, one of the 
criticisms made by proponents of Evo-Devo still holds, namely that 
population genetics ignores the processes through which phenotypes 
develop out of genotypes. 
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1.1. Ecological Genetics of the 1940s and 1950s 
There is perhaps no better characterization of ecological genetics 
than that given by its founder, E. B. Ford: 
 
It is a surprising fact that evolution, the fundamental concept 
of biology, has rarely been studied in wild populations by the 
fundamental techniques of science, those of observation and 
experiment. Consequently, the process has seldom been detected 
and analyzed in action. However, I have for many years attempted 
to remedy that omission by a method which has in fact proved 
effective: one which combines fieldwork and laboratory 
genetics.... The fieldwork needed in these investigations is of 
several kinds. It involves detailed observation… having strict 
regard to the ecology of the habitats. Also it often requires 
long-continued estimates of the frequency of genes or of 
characters controlled on a polygenic or a multi-factorial basis. 
(Ford 1964, p. 1; emphasis added) 
 
A number of well-known studies were done in this vein (including 
Ford’s own 1940 “Genetic research in the Lepidoptera”) in the 1940s 
and the 1950s, i.e., during and immediately following the Synthesis. 
Perhaps the best known of those considered in the tradition of Ford’s 
“school” of ecological genetics are the studies of Biston betularia 
(peppered moth) by H. B. D. Kettlewell (1955, 1956), the studies of 
Cepaea nemoralis (grove snail) by A. J. Cain and P. M. Sheppard (1950, 
1954), and the studies of Panaxia dominula (scarlet tiger moth) by R. 
A. Fisher and E. B. Ford (1947). 
 However, there are a number of other, equally well-known studies 
during this time period that are not part of the Fordian tradition but 
that fit Ford’s characterization of ecological genetics. That is, they 
combine observation and experiment, fieldwork and laboratory genetics, 
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with strict regard to the ecology of habitats, in order to study 
evolution in wild populations. These studies include Sewall Wright, 
Theodosius Dobzhansky, and Carl Epling’s (1942, 1943) studies of 
Linanthus parryae (desert snow), Maxime Lamotte’s (1951, 1959) studies 
of Cepaea nemoralis, and Wright’s (1948) studies of Panaxia dominula. 
I think it is fair to say that one of the primary differences between 
those who were truly in Ford’s tradition and those who were not is the 
former’s commitment to an adaptationist approach to evolution; 
however, as I have argued in particular with respect to the studies of 
Cepaea nemoralis (Millstein 2008, 2009), they in fact shared many 
techniques and assumptions. 
 The ecological genetics of this time period can be roughly 
characterized as follows. It required detailed knowledge of the 
organism under study and its habitat, including climate and 
interactions with other organisms, particularly predator/prey. Visible 
phenotypic traits were studied, with information about underlying 
genetics often inferred. (For example, Cain and Sheppard stated that 
work needed to be done on the genetics of Cepaea nemoralis, but that 
it appeared that they were dealing with two sets of genes–one 
controlling color and one controlling banding–with linkages of  
“varying degrees of closeness” (1950, p. 287), and they proceeded on 
those assumptions, assumptions that were later confirmed.)  Studies 
were performed across multiple generations, tracking evolutionary 
processes in the short term. Biologists used population-genetic 
equations to help determine which evolutionary processes were at work 
(particularly selection and drift) and to what extent (for example, 
Lamotte’s study of Cepaea nemoralis used Wright’s population genetics 
equations to show that the variance between small populations and 
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large populations were consistent with the expectations of random 
drift).  Key ecological variables of abundance (“population size”) and 
distribution (which types located where) were estimated using 
techniques such as mark, release, and recapture. 
 Importantly, the ecological genetics (understood broadly, as 
outlined here) of this time period exemplifies how ecology can 
influence population genetics and vice versa. Some biologists emerged 
from this time period convinced that it is primarily selection that 
governs the changes in the distributions of phenotypic traits over 
time, whereas others were convinced that multiple types of 
evolutionary processes govern those changes. This mixed lesson set the 
stage for later debates over the neutral theory.8 There was agreement, 
however, that in-depth knowledge of organisms in their habitats is 
essential for understanding whether selection is operating and what 
type of selection (selection by predator, climatic selection, etc.) is 
present, on which traits, in conjunction with which causal factors, 
whether biotic or abiotic. The studies showed convincingly that 
selection and other evolutionary processes occur at ecological time 
scales and that ecological variables such as abundance and 
distribution affect evolutionary processes (e.g., selection versus 
drift), and those processes in turn affect abundance and distribution. 
Finally, they showed that inter-species relationships (e.g., 
predator/prey) might matter for both ecology and evolution.  These 
insights were not always fully appreciated, however; for example, 
                                                
8 For elaboration of this point, see “The Origins of the Neutralist-
Selectionist Debates,” a transcript of a discussion involving John 
Beatty, James Crow, Michael Dietrich, and Richard Lewontin 
(http://authors.library.caltech.edu/5456/1/hrst.mit.edu/hrs/evolution/
public/transcripts/origins_transcript.html). 
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rather than seeing that ecological and evolutionary time scales are 
commensurate, Slobodkin (1961) famously distinguished between 
“ecological time” (about ten generations) and “evolutionary time” (on 
the order of one-half million years). 
 
1.2 Ecological Genetics Today 
Sara Via sees the roots of her work and the work of other contemporary 
biologists in that of E. B. Ford’s, although of course ecological 
genetics has not remained static: 
 
Despite many changes in techniques, several constants have 
emerged in ecological genetics as an approach to the study of 
evolution. First, the focus is on the genetics of ecologically 
important phenotypic traits that affect organisms’ interactions 
with their biotic and abiotic environments. These are the traits 
that become adaptations under natural selection and that may also 
lead to premating reproductive isolation. Next, ecological 
genetics is an experimental approach, with a focus on natural 
populations rather than on model systems. Finally, field studies 
of both genetic variability and natural selection have always 
been central to ecological genetics. (Via 2002, pp. S1-S2; 
emphasis added) 
 
Indeed, ecological genetics is alive and well. The Ecological Genetics 
Group is a special interest group of the British Ecological Society 
and the Genetics Society. Programs explicitly specializing in 
ecological genetics can be found at places such as the University of 
Helsinki, Michigan State University, and New Mexico State University. 
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Many more universities offer courses in ecological genetics. Below, I 
will discuss a contemporary case of ecological genetics in more 
detail. 
 
 
2. Another Strand of Population Genetics and Ecology: Population 
Biology 
 
2.1 Population Biology of the 1960s 
According to Jay Odenbaugh: 
 
In the 1960s, [Richard] Levins, Richard Lewontin, Robert 
MacArthur, E. O. Wilson, Leigh Van Valen, and others were 
interested in integrating different areas of population biology 
mathematically. Apparently they met on several occasions at the 
MacArthur’s lakeside home in Marlboro, Vermont discussing their 
own work in population genetics, ecology, biogeography, and 
ethology and how a "simple theory" might be devised. (Odenbaugh 
2006, p. 608) 
 
Odenbaugh (p. 609) contends “that Levins’ 1966 essay is a 
methodological statement and defense of this research program,” i.e., 
population biology. Levins first characterizes population genetics and 
population ecology, and then shows how population biology seeks to 
take on the projects of both: 
 
For population genetics, a population is specified by the 
frequencies of genotypes without reference to the age 
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distribution, physiological state as a reflection of past 
history, or population density. A single population or species is 
treated at a time, and evolution is usually assumed to occur in a 
constant environment. 
 
Population ecology, on the other hand, recognizes multispecies 
systems, describes populations in terms of their age 
distributions, physiological states, and densities. The 
environment is allowed to vary but the species are treated as 
genetically homogeneous, so that evolution is ignored. 
  
But there is increasing evidence that demographic time and 
evolutionary time are commensurate. Thus, population biology must 
deal simultaneously with genetic, physiological, and age 
heterogeneity within species of multispecies systems changing 
demographically and evolving under the fluctuating influences of 
other species in a heterogeneous environment. (Levins 1966, p. 
421; emphasis added) 
 
However, Levins (p. 431) famously concluded that one model could not 
cover all of population biology: “Thus, a satisfactory theory is 
usually a cluster of models.” The population biologists of this time 
period developed models of environmental heterogeneity (Levins 1968); 
density-dependent selection (Lewontin 1965; MacArthur 1962, 1965); 
limiting similarity, convergence and divergence of coexisting species 
(MacArthur and Levins 1967); and equilibrium island biogeography 
(MacArthur and Wilson 1967). 
 As with ecological genetics, the population biology of this time 
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period illustrates the way that ecology can influence (and has 
influenced) population genetics and vice versa. Whereas ecological 
genetics showed that ecological fieldwork could be integrated with 
population genetics, population biology showed that mathematical 
models of population genetics and ecology could be integrated.9 Other 
lessons from population biology include the following: In order to 
deal with the complexity of the systems under study in conjunction 
with human limitations, tradeoffs between generality, realism, and 
precision need to be made. Factors such as environmental heterogeneity 
affect the evolution of populations, which in turn affects ecological 
parameters such as niche breadth10 (contra Ho and Saunders, quoted 
above, who said that population genetics only sheds light on 
characteristics such as changes in coloration of moths). 
Simplifications made by population genetics models, such as holding 
fitness constant or limiting study to one species, can make a 
significant quantitative difference in some cases (as can ignoring 
short-term evolution in ecology)–this can either illuminate 
shortcomings of existing models or show that their simplifications are 
unproblematic, depending on whether the simplification in question 
does or does not make a significant difference to the predicted 
outcome. (Either way, something important is learned.) Finally, it 
                                                
9 The distinction between “ecological genetics” as involving ecological 
fieldwork and “population biology” as involving mathematical modeling 
that I am drawing here is not a strong one, i.e., I am not confident 
that those terms are consistently used in that way by contemporary 
biologists. But it appears that originally the terms had those 
connotations. 
10 Levins (1966) shows how different population biology models “all 
converge in supporting the theorem that environmental uncertainty 
leads to increased niche breadth” (pp. 426-427).  One of the models is 
a “simple genetic model with one locus and two alleles” and draws on 
insights from R.A. Fisher (p. 425). 
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became clear that metapopulations–understanding population structure, 
or the interactions of organisms across space and time–are important 
for understanding evolutionary changes over time. 
 
2.2 Population Biology Today 
In his textbook Population Biology: Concepts and Models, Alan Hastings 
identifies several areas where the interface between ecology and 
population genetics has “produced fruitful insights” (1997, p. 44): 
(1) Optimization concepts in ecology, where behavior of organisms 
is assumed to be optimal, e.g., by identifying circumstances under 
which natural selection can be expected to produce optimal traits; 
(2) Co-evolution, e.g., joint evolution of predator/prey, 
host/parasitoid, or plant/pollinator; and 
(3) Speciation, e.g., Orr’s (1995) model of speciation as the 
accumulation of genic incompatibilities between diverging populations 
(see also Via 2002). 
In short, the interface between ecology and population genetics has 
produced insights into concepts that are central to both ecology and 
evolution. 
Rama Singh and Marcy Uyenoyama’s edited volume The Evolution of 
Population Biology might be one measure of where population biology 
stands today.  It begins with essays by Lewontin and Levins that 
outline the project of population biology, followed by essays by 
renowned experts in the field that are meant to show how population 
biology has been carried out in practice.  Topics range from the 
characterization of the genomic response of an individual in its 
environment to analysis of biotic and abiotic causes of balancing 
selection to the role of hybrid zones as an evolutionary force to the 
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evolution of age-dependent fertility and mortality structures. Yet 
Lewontin and Levins state very clearly that they do not think that 
their vision has been fulfilled.  The editors also admit that “the 
efforts of numerous scientists who view themselves as population 
biologists” have not succeeded in “realizing the Lewontin/Levins 
vision of a population biology that integrates interactions at all 
levels of organization” (Singh and Uyenoyama 2009, p. 3). However, 
they suggest that “development of the field was not so much abandoned 
as postponed” and that the “pervasion of the molecular revolution 
throughout evolutionary biology” will allow interactions among levels 
of organization to be explored in depth, with the essays showing how 
population biology has been brought to the “threshold of full 
realization” (Singh and Uyenoyama 2009, p. 3).  Of course, such a 
contention will be controversial, but I think it is undeniable that 
progress has been made even while acknowledging that the goal has not 
yet been obtained.  Moreover, progress has been made in population 
biology topics not explored in the volume, such as the evolution and 
maintenance of metapopulation structures.  My point here is simply the 
modest one that good work has been done in population biology and that 
the quest persists in places such as the journal Theoretical 
Population Biology. 
 
 
3. Some Other Strands of Population Genetics and Ecology 
 
Above, I gave a brief overview of two different strands of biological 
practice where ecology and population genetics come together, namely 
ecological genetics and population biology. However, there are many 
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other strands (some very recent) where ecology and population genetics 
have intersected. 
Joan Roughgarden’s classic and influential 1979 textbook, Theory 
of Population Genetics and Evolutionary Ecology: An Introduction 
(reprinted in 1996) includes topics such as evolution in spatially and 
temporally varying environments, density-dependent natural selection, 
competition, and predation. Like population biology, Roughgarden’s 
textbook takes a mathematical approach towards synthesizing population 
genetics and ecology.11 Indeed, the preface to the original 1979 
edition seems to suggest that evolutionary ecology is an outgrowth of 
population biology: “Theoretical population biology is not a new field 
although its current visibility is unprecedented…. What is truly 
recent is the beginnings of a union of population genetic theory with 
the theory of population ecology” (Roughgarden 1996, p. vii). As 
Roughgarden notes in the preface to the reprint, however, 
“evolutionary ecology” has since gone beyond the point where 
“combining ecological theory with evolutionary theory boiled down to 
developing models for the simultaneous change of gene frequency and 
population size” and now includes topics such as game theory and 
models derived from the behavior and physiology of organisms, which 
are not derived from population genetics in the same way that the 
models of Roughgarden’s textbook are. 
Roughgarden (personal communication July 2011), however, objects 
to my characterization of her textbook as a significant force in 
bringing together population genetics and ecology, saying that her 
textbook was as popular as it was not because population geneticists 
                                                
11 11. Other work in this vein, and from around the same time period, 
includes that of León (1974) and Slatkin and Maynard Smith (1979). 
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accepted the importance of ecology to their field, but because the 
parts of the textbook that covered traditional population genetics 
topics did so with a clear exposition,12 and that some population 
geneticists go so far as to deny that density- and frequency-
dependence are part of population genetics. In short, she questions 
how prevalent integrations between population genetics and ecology 
are. Surely she is right that some population geneticists construe 
their field very narrowly, making it look as though there are very few 
intersections between ecology and population genetics, but even if 
that is true it does not overturn my claims in this paper.  I am not 
trying to show that intersections between population genetics and 
ecology form a majority of either field, which would require a very 
different sort of analysis than I am offering here; instead, I am 
trying to show that there is a lot of good work that has been done and 
continues to be done by well-known and influential people, and to 
suggest that we ought to pay attention to it. 
In addition to the general kind of approach exemplified by 
Roughgarden’s textbook, many intersections between ecology and 
population genetics show increasing specialization in different areas 
of ecology. Here is a brief outline of some of the strands (again, 
with the understanding that these are not meant to be entirely 
distinct from one another): 
 
Conservation Genetics: Conservation gentics is often traced to the 
work of Soulé in the 1980s, with Lande’s (1988) work seen as a 
                                                
12 I agree with Roughgarden that the textbook is very clear, as well as 
being better than most in laying out key concepts and assumptions! 
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landmark in the field. According to the journal Conservation Genetics, 
the field “focuses on the conservation of genetic diversity and in 
general, the application of genetic methods towards resolving problems 
in conservation.” 
 
Community Genetics: Antonovics (1992) seeks to examine the 
“evolutionary genetic processes that occur among interacting 
populations in communities,” realizing that most ecological systems do 
not involve simple pairwise interactions among species, but multiple 
complex interactions within and among trophic levels. A recent 
commentary by Wade (2003) reviews some of the groundwork of the field 
(e.g., Goodnight 1991) and describes two approaches to community 
genetics, one due to Whitham et al. (2003) emphasizing the community-
shaping effect of genetic variation in keystone species, the other due 
to Neuhauser et al. (2003), emphasizing strong selection in 
nonequilibrium, genetically subdivided communities. 
 
Niche Construction: Odling-Smee et al. (2003) propose a two-locus 
model, with alleles at one locus yielding a phenotype that affects the 
amount of a key resource in the environment and with the amount of the 
resource influencing the contribution to fitness of genotypes at a 
second locus.  Their book laid the groundwork for subsequent progress 
in the field. 
 
Landscape Genetics: Landscape genetics was initially defined simply as 
an “amalgamation of molecular population genetics and landscape 
ecology” with the aim of providing “information about the interaction 
between landscape features and microevolutionary processes, such as 
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gene flow, genetic drift, and selection” (Manel et al. 2003, p. 189). 
It has more recently been defined as “research that explicitly 
quantifies the effects of landscape composition, configuration and 
matrix quality on gene flow and spatial genetic variation” (Storfer et 
al. 2007; see Storfer et al. 2010 for a review of recent work in this 
area). 
 
Ecosystem Genetics: Ecosystem genetics has recently been characterized 
as the “study of the genetic interactions that occur between species 
and their abiotic environment in complex communities” (Whitham et al. 
2006; their paper reviews recent work in this area). This is an 
emerging field.  For example: “At the 2011 International Botanical 
Congress in Melbourne, Australia, a symposium entitled, ‘Community and 
ecosystem genetics: the extended genetic effects of plant species’, 
examined new research in the field of community and ecosystem 
genetics. Talks focused on: links between contemporary ecological 
interactions and historic evolutionary dynamics; the role of feedbacks 
as mechanisms in driving patterns of biodiversity and ecosystem 
function; and application of these approaches to management and 
conservation issues as they relate to global change” (Bailey et al. 
2012, p. 24). 
 
 Elaborating on each of these would be a large undertaking. 
Instead, to get the general flavor of this sort of work, let’s take a 
look at case studies that exhibit characteristics of traditional 
ecological genetics as well as contemporary conservation genetics and 
landscape genetics. Again, this will show the ways in which population 
genetics has been modified by ecology (and vice versa) and the ways in 
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which it has been found useful by practitioners. There are many such 
studies that I could describe, and I apologize for not citing them; 
this is meant to be illustrative. 
 
4. Studying the California Tiger Salamander (and the Barred Tiger 
Salamander) 
 
I will focus on two studies of the California Tiger Salamander (CTS) 
and the Barred Tiger Salamander (BTS) done by Brad Shaffer’s lab group 
at the University of California, Davis,13 studies that combine ecology 
and population genetics. However, it’s important to note that the 
group has done many other studies of the CTS, including laboratory 
studies of their genetics and development, more purely 
ecological/conservation biology studies of the movements and habits of 
the salamanders, etc. Thus, it’s really best to see the 
ecology/population genetics studies as one important component of a 
multi-faceted study of the CTS and its interactions with the BTS. 
Before describing the studies, however, we first need a bit of 
background. There are fourteen species of tiger salamanders across 
North America. Several populations of the CTS are listed as endangered 
under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Temporary vernal pools are 
breeding grounds for the CTS, though they spend much of their lives on 
land. The BTS, on the other hand, originates in Texas and the 
southwestern US. They attain larger size prior to metamorphosis and 
can be available further into the summer than native CTS, and thus 
make better live bait for large “trophy” bass. Because of their value 
                                                
13 Shaffer is now at the University of California, Los Angeles. 
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as bait, in the 1940s and 1950s bait dealers from the Salinas Valley 
imported thousands of BTS larvae into California. CTS and BTS had been 
allopatric for ca. 5 million years, but surprisingly, they can 
hybridize. They have been doing so in some areas of California for an 
estimated 15-30 generations. 
The most obvious ecological difference between the two species is 
that whereas CTS always metamorphose from a juvenile aquatic form to 
an adult land-dwelling form, BTS exhibits facultative paedomorphosis, 
i.e., it may (or may not) retain juvenile aquatic characteristics. 
Paedomorphosis is generally regarded as an adaptation for permanent 
aquatic habitats, because paedomorphs can breed earlier, and generally 
attain larger body size, larger clutches sizes for females, and 
possibly greater mating success for males. 
 
4.1 “Environment-Dependent Admixture Dynamics in a Tiger Salamander 
Hybrid Zone” 
Fitzpatrick and Shaffer (2006) compare CTS/BTS hybrids in three pool 
types: vernal pools, human-made ephemeral pools, and perennial pools, 
studying eight loci and four of each pond type, looking for departures 
from Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (HWE) and differences in the 
distributions of alleles between ponds. They find that seven of the 
twelve ponds deviated significantly from HWE expectations using all 
eight markers. They also find a preponderance of non-native alleles in 
perennial ponds, despite physical distances between ponds that are 
within the migration capability of the salamanders. They conclude that 
the salamanders seem to form a mosaic hybrid zone, with different 
selection pressures in perennial vs. ephemeral ponds. But is this a 
legitimate conclusion? 
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Pigliucci and Kaplan (2006), citing Hartl and Clark’s population 
genetics textbook, point out that many factors can cause a departure 
from HWE: overlapping generations, non-random mating, small population 
size, migration, etc. They suggest that this can “complicate (and 
often make impossible) a straightforward conclusion,” that “additional 
lines of evidence will be needed,” but that they are “seldom provided” 
(2006, p. 247-248). 
However, population geneticists who integrate ecology with 
population genetics are well equipped to address the well-known 
limitations of HWE analysis. For example, Fitzpatrick and Shaffer 
sample the spring young-of-the-year larvae so that overlapping 
generations and immigration are not an issue. They acknowledge that 
small population size (and thus drift) may be a factor, and emphasize 
the need for replicating their studies; they acknowledge that observed 
variation within pond types is probably due to drift. Moreover, they 
address the issue of non-random mating by stating that even though two 
of the three marker-specific deviations from HWE are habitat-specific, 
breeding is not likely to be habitat dependent given what else is 
known about the interactions between tiger salamanders and their 
habitats.14 That their conclusions are qualified should not concern us; 
                                                
14 Fitzpatrick and Shaffer elaborate, “The cues used by amphibians to 
emerge from their underground retreats in a Mediterranean climate are 
poorly understood. It is probably determined in part by physiological 
clocks and in part by how individuals experience the weather and other 
seasonal stimuli in their subterranean terrestrial habitat, rather 
than by the pond in which they will breed. Nonrandom fertilization 
seems unlikely to be affected much by the pond environment, although 
spermatophores may spend several minutes in the open water prior to 
internal fertilization (Arnold 1976; Howard et al. 1997). Other 
factors are more likely to have strong environment dependence. For 
example, visual or olfactory mate choice systems may be disrupted in 
the turbid, eutrophic water of artificial ponds, potentially 
explaining why there is a deficit of DLX3 heterozygotes only in the 
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as those who study science know well, no conclusion is ever 
definitive, and all are open to being overturned with new evidence. 
Pigliucci and Kaplan emphasize the need to find the causes 
underlying the statistics (a point on which we agree), suggesting that 
too many studies (albeit not all) fail to do this. However, 
Fitzpatrick and Shaffer do have a plausible mechanism for selection on 
BTS in perennial pools (i.e., their ability to retain aquatic 
characteristics), so their study satisfies this desideratum. (In my 
experience, provision of the causes is the rule in studies that 
combine ecology with population genetics rather than the exception–
indeed, that seems to be a large part of the point of such studies–but 
resolution of this disagreement is beyond the scope of this paper.) 
Pigliucci and Kaplan further suggest that substantiating selection 
requires a “detective” rather than a “statistician.” However, those 
who integrate population genetics with ecology can be both. It is not 
an either-or proposition. 
As Fitzpatrick and Shaffer (2007) describe, there are also some 
broader issues raised by the study of the CTS. First, there is the 
perennial question, “what is a species?” The answer has considerable 
practical import because, under the U.S. Endangered Species Act, only 
species (and not, e.g., sub-species) are explicitly listed for 
                                                                                                                                                       
less turbid vernal pools. Alternatively, components of the physical or 
biotic environment may cause stronger viability selection on embryos 
and young larvae in vernal pools. The habitat-dependent heterozygote 
excess at HOXD8 could arise because cattle ponds may present 
immunological challenges that would be unusual in cleaner vernal 
pools, leading to balancing selection or heterosis in gene regions 
involved in pathogen response” (Fitzpatrick and Shaffer 2004, p. 
1290). Although one referee of this paper suggested that Fitzpatrick 
and Shaffer’s explanation amounts to “hand waving,” I think it is an 
example of how knowledge of organisms in their habitats can help to 
overcome some of the problems with HWE analysis.  Of course, such 
explanations are defeasible, as Fitzpatrick and Shaffer readily 
acknowledge. 
27 
preservation. The CTS and BTS produce viable hybrids, yet they were 
distinct lineages for ca. 5 million years and have distinctive 
phenotypes and genetic characters. Should they be considered two 
species or one? If left alone, would the hybrids yield a new species? 
Or a return to an old?  
Other questions raised by the study of the CTS and the BTS 
include: Should we try to conserve both CTS and BTS? Is hybridization 
an extinction process for the CTS? Or should we conserve hybrids? 
Should we recommend converting perennial ponds to ephemeral ponds, 
which might help preserve the CTS, as a management strategy? Tiger 
salamanders can have substantial effects on the distribution and 
abundance of aquatic arthropods, frogs, and other salamanders; how 
does hybridization of the tiger salamanders affect them? 
By revealing the rates, patterns, and mechanisms of hybridization, 
population genetics combined with ecology has a central role to play 
in answering each of the above questions (contra Dupré’s 1993 
contention that population genetics has no practical benefits).15 
However, someone might be willing to grant these points, and yet not 
see how population genetics has changed through its contact with 
ecology. After all, the population genetics used in Fitzpatrick and 
Shaffer (2006) seems close to the very traditional and narrow 
characterization of population genetics mentioned above: “Models that 
                                                
15 Note that my claim is not that the Shaffer Lab is the only, or even 
the first, to perform such studies. For example, the Collins Lab at 
ASU performed similar studies of a species of salamander native to 
Arizona, raising many similar ethical and policy issues (Jones et al. 
1995; Maienschein et al. 1998; Storfer et al. 2004). Rather, my claim 
is that the Shaffer Lab studies are illustrative of many such 
excellent studies.  
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have their roots in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium.”16 So, let us turn to 
another study from the Shaffer Lab Group that fits the broader 
characterization of population genetics that I gave above: “Models 
that track or infer frequency changes in genotypes and phenotypes over 
time, and the way that various evolutionary mechanisms affect those 
changes.” 
 
4.2 “Landscape Genetics and Least-Cost Path Analysis Reveal Unexpected 
Dispersal Routes in the California Tiger Salamander” 
Wang et al. (2009) characterize their study as a contribution to the 
burgeoning field of landscape genetics, mentioned briefly above. One 
goal of landscape genetics is to understand how landscapes affect 
genetic variation in natural population; Wang et al., this time 
focusing solely on the CTS, elaborate on this relationship. In 
particular, as Fitzpatrick and Shaffer (2007) show in an earlier 
ecological/landscape genetics analysis, habitat affects gene flow, but 
can this relationship be quantified? In this study, noting that it is 
almost impossible to directly study the migration of organisms such as 
the CTS (which spends much of its adult life in underground burrows), 
they use an alternative approach, one which makes use of the 
“integration of GIS-based tools with population genetic analyses” 
(Wang et al. 2009). The study area consisted of the habitats 
surrounding a relatively isolated and intact set of sixteen17 natural 
                                                
16 Although Fitzpatrick and Shaffer certainly go beyond a one-locus, 
two-allele model! 
 
17 Their BAPS software, looking for significant allele frequency 
differences, identified 15 different populations. 
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vernal pools in Fort Ord Natural Reserve. They used two main types of 
analysis: a genetic assignment method using 13 microsatellite loci, 
implemented in BayesAss+, and a GIS least-cost path analysis. The 
former is a Bayesian multilocus genotyping method for estimating rates 
of recent migration among populations.18 The latter seeks to identify 
dispersal corridors and determine the cost of movement through the 
three identified habitat types (grassland, chaparral, and oak 
woodland). They constructed a detailed habitat map based upon 
satellite imagery and field surveys, scoring each cell with a value 
corresponding to either vernal pool or one of the three habitat types. 
They then performed 24,843 least-cost path analyses, run on different 
possible combinations of costs, in order to find combinations of cost 
values that would result in least-cost path distances predicted by the 
gene flow estimates (assuming higher rates of gene flow indicated 
relatively less costly dispersal). 
Based on Wang et al.’s BayesAss+ analysis, four ponds showed 
significant rates of dispersal, and these rates were also quite high; 
10.5%-19% of the target populations could be explained by gene flow 
from the source. Based on their least-cost path analysis, Wang et al. 
conclude that migration through chaparral is the least costly to the 
CTS; movement through grassland is approximately twice as costly as 
                                                
18 As Wilson and Rannala explain, “The method requires fewer assumptions 
than estimators of long-term gene flow and can be legitimately applied 
to nonstationary populations that are far from genetic equilibrium. 
Moreover, the newly proposed method relaxes a key assumption of 
previous nonequilibrium methods for assigning individuals to 
populations and identifying migrants—namely that genotypes are in 
Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium within populations. We allow arbitrary 
genotype frequency distributions within populations by incorporating a 
separate inbreeding coefficient for each population. The joint 
probability distribution of inbreeding coefficients is estimated from 
the data” (2003, p. 1178). 
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through chaparral, and movement through oak woodland is roughly five 
times as costly as through chaparral. This was a surprising result, 
since the CTS is normally associated with a grassland habitat; Wang et 
al. speculate that whereas the CTS may prefer to reside in grassland, 
it may prefer to move through chaparral. Wang et al. state that 
“Landscape genetics is playing an increasingly important role in 
population genetics by providing a framework for quantitatively 
modelling the effects of landscapes on gene flow, population 
substructure, and genetic variation,” (2009, p. 1373; emphasis added) 
and indeed, I think it is fair to say that their analysis of the CTS 
is a beautiful demonstration of how this is possible. And again, the 
conservation significance is clear. 
 
The two studies of the CTS that I have described here illustrate some 
of the ways in which ecology and population genetics can intersect. In 
the first, ecological knowledge informs our population-genetics-based 
conclusions, with the population genetics models being used in a 
fairly standard way. The second study extends the ecological genetics 
analysis of Fitzpatrick and Shaffer (2007), which showed how 
correlational analyses can shed light on the ways that habitat affects 
population genetics processes such as gene flow and selection, by 
showing how such effects can be quantified, setting the stage for 
further integration between population genetics and ecology. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
I conclude with some reflections about theory in general and about 
population genetics in particular. With respect to theory in general, 
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I think two major insights can be drawn from this examination of 
population genetics and ecology. The first is that, while some of this 
work can be described as almost purely theoretical/mathematical, and 
while it is easy to play up the split between theoreticians and 
empirically-driven scientists, I think much of the work discussed here 
does not fit these neat categories, with empirical findings driving 
the need for better models (e.g., density dependence), and with new 
mathematical tools allowing for better analyses in the field (e.g., 
GIS least-cost path analysis and BayesAss+ analysis; see Griesemer 
[2012, this volume] for a more extended discussion of the interplay 
between theory and empirical practice). Second, although a number of 
philosophers have sought to analyze the nature of theory change (e.g., 
Kuhn 1962; Lakatos 1978; Hull 1988; Darden 1991), they have generally 
seen theory change as a linear process (Darden may be the exception 
here). Yet the intersections between ecology and population genetics 
highlighted here are hardly linear. Rather, they are multi-stranded 
and overlapping. Moreover, there are parts of ecology and population 
genetics that do not overlap with each other, and there are 
innumerable models, each representing a partial approach (see Longino 
2012, this volume) to representing evolutionary and ecological 
processes. So, a neat and tidy picture of theory change will not work 
for these domains. We need a picture that shows theories changing in 
multiple directions, driven by a variety of empirical and theoretical 
requirements, separately and in tandem. 
With respect to population genetics in particular, I hoped to have 
shown the following. 
Population genetics is more than an abstract set of tools found in 
textbooks; it can and has been applied to real organisms and their 
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traits, and real-world situations and problems. 
Population genetics has undergone continuous and significant 
changes since the 1950s, in part by integrating with other fields such 
as ecology, with the boundaries between fields becoming more blurred 
over time (see Lynch 2007 and Futuyma 2010 for discussion of other 
types of changes). Furthermore, those changes have been in many 
directions: niche construction, landscape genetics, etc. (again, this 
is not to deny that some population genetics work continues to have 
little contact with ecology and vice versa). 
Thus, if we are to discuss the role of population genetics in 
evolutionary theory, we need to use a contemporary characterization of 
it. If we are going to discuss what a theory doesn’t do (e.g., 
incorporate development), we should not forget what it can do (e.g., 
form productive intersections with ecology). And if we are to discuss 
the possibility of or the need for Extended Synthesis to include 
development, we need to recognize that many syntheses have already 
occurred–so, with which version should we synthesize? Population 
genetics may not be required for all evolutionary explanations (contra 
Lynch 2007, although I have not sought to argue that point here), and 
it may not incorporate all the causal factors of evolution, but it is 
a powerful tool that continues to be used and modified. 
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